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Abstract
Schulze voting is a recently introduced voting system enjoying unusual popularity
and a high degree of real-world use, with users including the Wikimedia foundation,
several branches of the Pirate Party, and MTV. It is a Condorcet voting system that
determines the winners of an election using information about paths in a graph repre-
sentation of the election. We resolve the complexity of many electoral control cases for
Schulze voting. We find that it falls short of the best known voting systems in terms of
control resistance, demonstrating vulnerabilities of concern to some prospective users
of the system.
1 Preliminaries
1.1 Schulze Voting
Schulze voting is a Condorcet voting system recently introduced by Marcus Schulze [Sch11].
It was designed to effectively handle candidate cloning: In many voting systems, the inclu-
sion of several similar candidates ends up spreading out their support from similarly-minded
voters and thus lessens the influence of those voters. It has a somewhat more complex win-
ner procedure than other common voting systems, requiring the use of a graph best-path
finding algorithm, but it is still solvable in polynomial time, rendering Schulze a tractable
voting system.
Schulze voting is currently used by a number of organizations for their internal elections,
including the Wikimedia foundation, several branches of the Pirate Party, a civil-liberties
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focused political party, and by MTV to rank music videos. This level of real-world usage is
unusual for a new, academically proposed and studied voting system, but it makes Schulze
voting more compelling to analyze.
As a typical Condorcet system, the winners are determined by examining the pairwise
contests between candidates. We will thus introduce some useful functions and notation.
The advantage function is a function on pairs of candidates where adv(a, b) is the number
of voters in the given election that prefer a to b (that is, rank a higher than b in their
preferences). The net advantage function gives the net difference in advantage for one
candidate over another. We define the net advantage between a and b to be the following:
netadv(a, b) = adv(a, b)− adv(b, a).
The winners in a Schulze election are determined as follows. Generate the net advantage
scores for the election, and represent this data as a graph, with vertices for candidates and
directed edges denoting net advantage scores. Determine the strongest paths in this graph
between every pair of candidates by the following metric: the weight of a path is the lowest
weight edge in the path. This is the “bottleneck” metric. We can adapt the Floyd-Warshall
dynamic programming algorithm to find the weigh of such paths in polynomial time [Sch11].
procedure Schulze Paths(netadv)
initialize paths to netadv
for k = 1 to m do
for i = 1 to m do
for j = 1 to m do
if i == j then
next
end if
newpath← min(paths[i][k], paths[k][j])
paths[i][j]← max(newpath, paths[i][j])
end for
end for
end for
return paths
end procedure
Figure 1: Procedure to calculate Schulze best-path scores, adapted from Floyd-Warshall
algorithm.
Once we have the best path weights, we build another graph with the same vertices
where there is a directed edge from a to b if the best path from a to b is better than the
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best path from b to a. The winners of the election are the candidates with no in-edges in
this final graph.
Note that a Condorcet winner will have positive net advantage edges to every other
candidate, and so they will easily have the better paths to every other candidate and be the
only winner of the election.
1.1.1 Example Election
Consider an election over candidates {a, b, c} with the following voters.
# Voters Preferences
3 a > b > c
3 b > c > a
2 c > a > b
These voters express the following net advantage function over the candidates.
a b c
a 2 -2
b -2 4
c 2 -4
We can also represent this election as a graph as follows.
b
b
b
a
b
c
2
4
2
Figure 2: Election graph for the example Schulze election.
Now we must find the best paths between pairs of candidates. Note that our three
candidates are in a Condorcet cycle and there is no clearly dominant candidate: each of
them lose to one other candidate, and each candidate has a path to both of the other
candidates. The following are the Schulze path scores.
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a b c
a 2 2
b 2 4
c 2 2
Candidates a and b have equally good paths to each other, as do a and c. Candidate b
has a strictly stronger path to c than c does to b. So we can see that the winners will be a
and b, as neither of these candidates are beaten in best-path strength.
1.2 Election Manipulative Actions
There are several classes of manipulative action problems studied in computational social
choice. The primary classes of these problems are manipulation, where a voter or voters
strategically vote to affect the result of an election [BTT89], bribery, where an outside briber
pays off voters to change their votes [FHH09], and control, where an election organizer
alters the structure of an election to change the result [BTT92]. We will later describe
manipulation and control in more detail.
These problems are formalized as decision problems in the way typical in computer
science and we study their complexity in various voting systems. There is some standard
terminology about the behavior of voting systems under manipulative actions. A voting
system is immune to a manipulative action if it can never change the result of an election in
the voting system, and it is susceptible otherwise. If a voting system is susceptible to some
action and the decision problem is in P, then it is vulnerable to it, while if the problem is
NP-hard, the voting system is resistant to it.
The original versions of these problems are the constructive cases, where the goal is
to make a particular candidate win. The alternative class of problems are the destructive
cases, where the goal is to make a particular candidate not win. These were introduced by
introduced by Conitzer et al. [CSL07] in the context of manipulation and later by Hemas-
paandra et al. in the context of control [HHR07]. Though the constructive goal may be
more desirable, the destructive version of a problem may be easy where the constructive
version is not, so investigating both is useful.
Additionally, there are differing versions of these problems based on our tie-handling
philosophy. The work presented here follows the nonunique winner model, where we claim
success in our manipulative action when the preferred candidate is one of possibly several
winners in the election in the constructive case, or is not among the set of winners in the
election in the destructive case. In contrast, the original paper exploring control [BTT92]
used the unique winner model, where the goal is to cause a candidate to be the only winner
of an election, or in the destructive cases for the candidate to be not a unique winner. Both
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models are common in the literature.
1.3 Manipulation
The manipulation problem is the most basic of the election manipulative action problems.
The manipulation problem models strategic voting, where a voter or set of voters attempt
to vote in some way (not necessarily reflecting their true preferences) to sway the result of
the election and cause their favorite candidate to win, or else to cause some hated candidate
to lose. The computational complexity of this problem was first studied by Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick [BTT89]. We will now formally define the manipulation problem in the
nonunique-winner model.
Manipulation
Given An election (C, V ), a set of manipulators M , and a distinguished candidate p.
Question (Constructive) Is there a way to assign the votes of M such that p is a winner
of the election (C, V ∪M)?
Question (Destructive) Is there a way to assign the votes of M such that p is not a
winner of the election (C, V ∪M)?
1.4 Control
Control encompasses actions taken by an election chair to change the structure of an election
to achieve a desired result. This can include adding or deleting candidates or voters, or
partitioning either candidates or voters and performing initial subelections. The study of
election control was initiated by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92], and many subsequent
papers have investigated the complexity of control in various voting systems.
Much of the study of control has had the goal of finding voting systems that are highly
resistant to control. Faliszewski et al. showed that related systems Llull and Copeland
voting are resistant to every case of constructive control [FHHR09]. Hemaspaandra et al.
constructed unnatural hybrid voting systems that resist every case of control, proving that
such systems can exist [HHR09]. Erde´lyi et al. showed that the system fallback voting resists
20 out of the 22 standard cases of control, and it stands as the most resistant natural voting
system [ER10, EF10, EPR11]. No natural system resistant to every case of control has yet
been found.
The various control problems loosely model many real-world actions. The cases of adding
and deleting voters correspond to voter registration drives and voter suppression efforts. The
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cases of adding and deleting candidates correspond to ballot-access procedures that effec-
tively remove many candidates from elections. Cases of partitioning voters are similar to the
real-world practice of gerrymandering (though that has additional geographic constraints),
and cases of partitioning candidates correspond to primary elections or runoffs. We will
now formally define the various cases of control, in the nonunique-winner model.
Control by Adding Candidates
Given Disjoint candidate sets C and D, a voter set V with preferences over C ∪ D, a
distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and k ∈ N.
Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make p a winner of an election (C ∪ D′, V )
with some D′ ⊆ D where ‖D′‖ ≤ k?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make p not a winner of an election (C ∪D′, V )
with some D′ ⊆ D where ‖D′‖ ≤ k?
Control by Adding an Unlimited Number of Candidates
Given Disjoint candidate sets C and D, a voter set V with preferences over C ∪D, and a
distinguished candidate p ∈ C.
Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make p a winner of an election (C ∪ D′, V )
with some D′ ⊆ D?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make p not a winner of an election (C ∪D′, V )
with some D′ ⊆ D?
Control by Deleting Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and k ∈ N.
Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make p a winner of an election (C − C′, V )
with some C′ ⊆ C where ‖C′‖ ≤ k?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make p not a winner of an election (C − C′, V )
with some C′ ⊆ (C − {p}) where ‖C′‖ ≤ k?
Control by Adding Voters
Given A candidate set C, disjoint voter sets V and W , a distinguished candidate p ∈ C,
and k ∈ N.
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Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make p a winner of an election (C, V ∪W ′) for
some W ′ ⊆W where ‖W ′‖ ≤ k?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make p not a winner of an election (C, V ∪W ′)
for some W ′ ⊆W where ‖W ′‖ ≤ k?
Control by Deleting Voters
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate p ∈ C, and k ∈ N.
Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make p a winner of an election (C, V −V ′) for
some V ′ ⊆ V where ‖V ′‖ ≤ k?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make p not a winner of an election (C, V − V ′)
for some V ′ ⊆ V where ‖V ′‖ ≤ k?
Control by Partition of Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ) and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C.
Question (Constructive) Is there a partition (C1, C2) of C such that p is a final winner
of the election (D ∪ C2, V ), where D is the set of candidates surviving the initial
subelection (C1, V )?
Question (Destructive) Is there a partition C1, C2 of C such that p is not a final winner
of the election (D∪C2, V ), where D is the set of candidates surviving the subelection
(C1, V )?
Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ) and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C.
Question (Constructive) Is there a partition C1, C2 of C such that p is a final winner of
the election (D1 ∪D2, V ), where D1 and D2 are the sets of surviving candidates from
the subelections (C1, V ) and (C2, V )?
Question (Destructive) Is there a partition C1, C2 of C such that p is not a final winner
of the election (D1 ∪ D2, V ), where D1 and D2 are the sets of surviving candidates
from the subelections (C1, V ) and (C2, V )?
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Control by Partition of Voters
Given An election E = (C, V ) and a distinguished candidate p ∈ C.
Question (Constructive) Is there a partition V1, V2 of V such that p is a final winner of
the election (D1 ∪D2, V ) where D1 and D2 are the sets of surviving candidates from
the subelections (C, V1) and (C, V2)?
Question (Destructive) Is there a partition V1, V2 of V such that p is not a final winner
of the election (D1 ∪ D2, V ) where D1 and D2 are the sets of surviving candidates
from the subelections (C, V1) and (C, V2)?
2 Results
Parkes and Xia studied the complexity of the manipulative action problems for Schulze
voting [PX12]. They proved resistance for Schulze voting for bribery and for some of the
control cases, and showed that constructive manipulation is easy with a single manipulator.
Recently Gaspers et al. showed that coalitional manipulation is easy as well [GKNW13].
However several control cases as well as constructive manipulation with multiple manip-
ulators remained open. We now will present our results on control and manipulation for
Schulze voting. Our new results are the following:
• In the nonunique-winner model, it is never necessary to make multiple manipulators
vote differently from each other to successfully perform manipulation, while this does
not hold for the unique-winner model.
• Schulze voting is resistant to constructive control by unlimited adding of candidates.
• Schulze voting is resistant to constructive control by deleting candidates.
• Schulze voting is resistant to constructive control by partition/runoff partition of can-
didates, ties promote or ties eliminate.
• Schulze voting is vulnerable to destructive control by partition/runoff partition of
candidates, ties promote or ties eliminate.
• Schulze voting is resistant to constructive or destructive control by partition of voters,
ties promote or ties eliminate.
Table 1 shows the behavior of Schulze voting, as well as several other voting systems,
under control.
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Control by Tie Plurality Approval Fallback Schulze
Model C D C D C D C D
Adding Candidates R R I V R R R S
Adding Candidates (unlimited) R R I V R R R S
Deleting Candidates R R V I R R R S
Partition of Candidates TE R R V I R R R V
TP R R I I R R R V
Run-off Partition of Candidates TE R R V I R R R V
TP R R I I R R R V
Adding Voters V V R V R V R R
Deleting Voters V V R V R V R R
Partition of Voters TE V V R V R R R R
TP R R R V R R R R
Table 1: Control behavior under Schulze voting and other voting systems for comparison.
V, R, S, and I stand for vulnerable, resistant, susceptible, and immune. Results proved in
this work in bold, other results from [ER10, EF10, EPR11, HHR07, PX12].
2.1 Manipulation
Parkes and Xia proved that manipulation is easy for Schulze voting with a single manipula-
tor [PX12]. Their algorithm was designed for the unique-winner model but as they note it is
easily adaptable to the nonunique-winner model as well. It is not, however, easily adaptable
to cases with multiple manipulators. With a single manipulator, it can be seen whether
manipulation is possible simply by checking if the relative Schulze scores between p and
other candidates are such that it is feasible. That is, in the unique-winner model, checking
that no other candidate is beating p in Schulze score, or in the nonunique-winner model,
checking that no candidate is beating p in Schulze score by more than two. With two or
more manipulators this is not the case in either tie-handling model.
In the nonunique winner model, in positive manipulation instance all manipulators in
the coalition can always vote identically, while in the unique model they may sometimes
have to vote differently to succeed. We will demonstrate the first point.
By including a single manipulator vote, we shift all of the net advantage values in the
election by one in either direction. With m manipulators, if they are given the same votes,
all of the net advantage values will shift by m. If we instead give manipulators differing
votes, some or all of the net advantage scores will change by less than m. So we would have
to assign the manipulator votes differently if there was some pair of candidates where we
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needed to alter their net advantage by less than m. We will show that that would never be
necessary.
Suppose we have a positive Schulze manipulation instance with p as the preferred can-
didate and with m manipulators, and there are candidates b and c such that we must alter
netadv(b, c) by less than m to make p a winner. We will be prevented from decreasing
netadv(b, c) by m if doing so will excessively weaken a path from p to some d. This will be
the case if (b, c) is on the best path from p to c, p has a path to b that after manipulation is
greater than netadv(b, c)−m in strength, and there is an equally strong path from c to d,
but also there is a path from c to p that will be greater than netadv(b, c)−m in strength.
We would be prevented from increasing netadv(b, c) by m if doing so would strengthen
a path from some a to p to be greater than netadv(p, a) after manipulation. This would
happen if (b, c) is a bottleneck on the strongest path from a to p, with other edges stronger
as well. The strongest path from c to p would have to be at least netadv(b, c)+m in strength
after manipulation. But if this is the case, with (b, c) also being a bottleneck from p to some
candidate, and therefore with the best path to c containing (b, c), p would lose to c if we do
not increase (b, c) by m. But we assumed we could make p a winner by changing netadv(b, c)
by less than m, so this is a contradiction.
Schulze manipulation in the unique-winner model does not have this property and there
are instances where it is necessary to have manipulators vote differently. Consider the
following instance with two manipulators. Again we will have candidates b and c such that
(b, c) is the edge of interest in the election graph. A candidate a has a strong path to b,
and has (b, c) as a bottleneck edge in their best path to a candidate d. d has a path to b of
weight netadv(b, c). a is performing strongly against all other candidates, such that all but
d can at best tie them in Schulze score after manipulation. The preferred candidate p needs
netadv(b, c) to stay at least where it is so they can beat c, but increasing it will not cause
any problems. So now the problem is to make p not just a winner but a unique winner. We
can’t decrease netadv(b, c) without making p lose, but if we increase it, a will be at least
tied with every other candidate and they will also be a winner. The only way to make p a
unique winner is to keep (b, c) unchanged while boosting the path from d to a such that a
loses to d. So to make p a unique winner, we would have to have one manipulator rank b
over c while the other ranks c over b.
2.2 Control
2.2.1 Constructive Control by Adding/Unlimited Adding of Candidates Case
Theorem 2.1. Schulze voting is resistant to constructive control by adding of candidates
and constructive control by unlimited adding of candidates.
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Proof. We will prove this case through a reduction from 3SAT. Given a 3SAT instance
(U,Cl), we will construct a control instance (C,D, p, k) as follows. The original candidate
set C will be the following:
• The distinguished candidate p;
• An additional special candidate a.
• A candidate for each clause ci.
• For each variable xi, a candidate x
′
i.
• For each variable xi, a candidate x
′′
i .
The auxiliary candidate set D will consist of the following:
• The “literal” candidates: For each variable xi, candidates x
+
i and x
−
i
The voter set V will be constructed such that we have the following relationships between
the candidates (both those in C and in D):
• For every clause ci, candidate ci beats p by 2 votes.
• For every variable xi, candidate x
′
i beats p by 2 votes.
• For every variable xi, p beats candidate x
′′
i by 2 votes.
• For every variable xi, candidates x
+
i and x
−
i beat x
′
i by 4 votes.
• For every variable xi, x
′′
i beats x
−
i , x
−
i beats x
+
i , and x
+
i beats p, all by four votes.
• For every variable xi, candidates x
+
i beats every clause candidate ci where the corre-
sponding clause is satisfied by xi assigned to true, by 4 votes.
• For every variable xi, candidates x
−
i beats every clause candidate c where the corre-
sponding clause is satisfied by xi assigned to false, by 4 votes.
• p beats a by 4 votes.
• For every variable xi, a beats candidates x
+
i and x
−
i by 4 votes.
In the limited case, the bound will be equal to ||D||, the size of the auxiliary candidate
set.
We will show that p can be made a winner through adding candidates if and only if there
is a satisfying assignment for the 3SAT instance.
11
Given a satisfying assignment for the 3SAT instance, build the corresponding set of added
candidates, where x+i is included if xi is set to true, and x
−
i is included otherwise. We can
show that p will be a winner with this set of candidates added. Since these candidates
correspond to a satisfying assignment, and every literal candidate x+i or x
−
i beats by 4
every clause candidate they satisfy, and since p has a strong path to each literal candidate
(through a), there will be a strong path from p to each clause candidate ci, stronger than
the strength-of-2 edge from ci to p. Since we have added exactly one of x
+
i , x
−
i for each
xi, we create a strong path from p to the x
′
i candidate, and we prevent there from being a
strong path from x′′i to p, as such a path would have to go through both of those candidates.
Thus no candidate will have a better path to p than p has to that candidate, so p will be a
winner.
We will show that if we map to a positive control instance, we must have mapped from a
satisfiable 3SAT instance. To make p a winner of the election, we must ensure p’s paths to
other candidates are at least as strong as other candidates’ paths to p. p immediately has
strong paths to any of the added literal candidates. To beat each of the clause candidates
we must add literal candidates that give p a path to each of them. To beat the x′i candidates
we must add at least one of x+i or x
−
i for each xi. To beat the x
′′
i candidates we must not
add both of x+i and x
−
i for each xi. Thus to have a successful control instance, we must
set every variable to one of true or false in such a way that satisfies each clause. Thus if we
have a positive control instance we must have a positive 3SAT instance.
2.2.2 Constructive Control by Deleting Candidates Case
Theorem 2.2. Schulze voting is resistant to constructive control by deleting candidates.
Proof. CC-DC Case
We prove this case through a reduction from 3SAT. Given a 3SAT instance (U,Cl) we
will construct a control instance ((C, V ), p, k) as follows. Our deletion limit k will be equal
to ||Cl||. The candidate set will be the following:
• Our special distinguished candidate p.
• For each clause ci ∈ Cl, k + 1 candidates c
1
i , . . . c
k+1
i .
• A candidate for each literal xji in each of the clauses (where x
j
i is the jth literal in the
ith clause).
• For each pair of literals xji , x
n
m where one is the negation of the other, k+1 candidates
n1i,j,m,n, . . . n
k+1
i,j,m,n.
• An additional auxiliary candidate a.
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The k + 1 candidates for each clause and for each conflicting pair of literals are treated as
copies of each other, and are included to prevent successful control by simply deleting the
tough opponents rather than solving the more difficult problem corresponding to the 3SAT
instance.
The voters will be constructed according to the McGarvey method [McG53] such that
we have the following relationships between candidates.
• For the three literal candidates x1i , x
2
i , x
3
i in a clause ci, c
j
i beats x
1
i (for all j), x
1
i beats
x2i , x
2
i beats x
3
i , and x
3
i beats p, all by two votes.
• For a pair of literal candidates xji and x
n
m that are negations of each other, each beats
nli,j,m,n (for all l) by two votes.
• Every negation candidate nli,j,m,n beats p by two votes.
• p beats a by two votes.
• a beats every xji by two votes.
This completes the specification of the reduction, which clearly can be performed in
polynomial time. The intuition is as follows: Deleting a literal corresponds to assigning
that literal to be true, and to make p win we must “assign” literals that satisfy every
clause without ever “assigning” a variable to be both true and false, so a successful deletion
corresponds to a valid satisfying assignment.
We will now show that if (U,Cl) is a positive 3SAT instance, p can be made a winner of
this election by deleting k candidates. We will delete one literal candidate for each clause,
selecting a literal that is satisfied by the satisfying assignment for Cl. This will require us to
delete ||Cl|| candidates, which is equal to our deletion limit k. By deleting these candidates,
we break all the paths from the clause candidates to p, so now p is tied with each clause
candidate instead of being beaten by them. Also, since we deleted literals that were satisfied
according to a satisfying assignment, we must not have deleted any pair of literals that were
the negations of each other, so we will still have a path from p to each negation candidate.
Thus p at least ties every other candidate in Schulze score, so they will be a winner.
If we map to a positive control instance, our 3SAT instance must be positive as well.
First, the most serious rivals to p are the clause candidates, who each have a path of strength
two to p while p only has a path of strength 0 to them. Since there are many duplicates of
each of them, we cannot remove them directly but must instead remove other vertices along
the paths to p to remove the threat. The deletion limit allows us to delete one candidate
for every clause. However, we must choose which ones to delete carefully. If we delete
a literal and a different one that is the negation of the first, we destroy our only paths
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to the corresponding negation candidate. Thus we must delete one literal for each clause,
while avoiding deleting a variable and its negation. If there is a successful way to do this,
there will be a satisfying assignment for the input instance that we can generate using our
selection of deleted/satisfied literals (arbitrarily assigning variables that were not covered
in this selection).
2.2.3 Constructive Control by Partition of Candidates Cases
Theorem 2.3. Schulze voting is resistant to constructive control by partition and runoff
partition of candidates, ties eliminate.
Proof. We will reduce from 3SAT. Given a 3SAT instance (Cl, U), we construct a control
instance ((C, V ), p). The candidate set C will consist of the following.
• The distinguished candidate p.
• For every variable xi ∈ U , candidates x
+
i , x
−
i , and x
′
i.
• For every clause ci ∈ Cl, a candidate ci.
• Adversary candidates c′ and u′.
• Helper candidates a and a′.
The relationships between candidates will be as follows.
• Every clause candidate c beats p by 4 votes.
• Every clause candidate c beats a by 4 votes.
• c′ beats p by 2 votes.
• c′ beats a by 4 votes.
• u′ beats p by 4 votes.
• a beats a′ by 4 votes.
• a′ beats every x+i and x
−
i by 4 votes.
• p beats every x+i and x
−
i by 2 votes.
• c′ beats u′ by 2 votes.
• c′ beats every ci by 2 votes.
• u′ beats every x′i by 4 votes.
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• For every xi, x
′
i beats x
−
i , x
−
i beats x
+
i , and x
+
i beats a, all by 4 votes.
• a beats u′ by 2 votes.
• For every variable xi, candidates x
+
i beats every clause candidate ci where the corre-
sponding clause is satisfied by xi assigned to true, by 4 votes.
• For every variable xi, candidates x
−
i beats every clause candidate c where the corre-
sponding clause is satisfied by xi assigned to false, by 4 votes.
We will show that p can be made a winner of (C, V ) through control by partition (or
runoff partition) of candidates if and only if (U,Cl) is a positive instance of 3SAT.
Assume that (U,Cl) is a satisfiable 3SAT instance. Then consider the partition of the
candidates with the first partition (the one that undergoes the initial election in the non-
runoff case) containing the x+i and x
−
i candidates corresponding to the satisfying assignment,
and also all other candidates except p. We will show that no candidates will be promoted
from this first subelection, and p will win the final election. Since we have x+i and x
−
i
candidates corresponding to a satisfying assignment, there is a strong path from a to every
clause candidate ci. One of each of x
+
i and x
−
i is not present for every xi, breaking potential
paths from x′i candidates to a. The overall effect is that a will be a winner, along with c
′ and
a number of other candidates, and since we are in the ties-eliminate model, no candidates will
be promoted from this subelection. Depending on whether we are in the partition or runoff
partition case, p either faces the remaining candidates (the unchosen variable assignment
candidates) in an initial subelection or in the final election, and they will win.
Assume that we map to an accepting instance of the control problem. We will show
that there must be a satisfying assignment for the 3SAT instance. p only beats the variable
assignment candidates and a, and only narrowly. p can’t survive an election that contains
any of the other candidates, so we must eliminate them in an initial subelection. c′ has
as path to every candidate of strength 2, and no other candidate has a path to them of
greater than strength 2, so they will invariably be a winner of any subelection of which they
are a part. So the only way to eliminate them is to force a tie in an initial subelection.
a has potential to tie c′, but to do so we have to give them a strong path to every clause
candidate, and ensure there are no paths from any of the x′ candidates. Thus we need
to include variable assignment candidates satisfying each clause, but not include both the
x+ and x− candidates for any x. So if control is possible, there must be a valid satisfying
assignment for the 3SAT instance.
Theorem 2.4. Schulze voting is resistant to constructive control by partition and runoff
partition of candidates, ties promote.
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Proof. In the ties-promote case we can use a similar reduction to the previous case. In this
version, we alter the candidate set and net advantage scores so that the helper candidate
a can be made a unique winner of their subelection if and only if there is a satisfying
assignment, and p can only win the final election if a is a unique winner of a subelection.
The candidate set is as follows. Compared to the previous case, we have eliminated the
adversary candidates c′ and u′. They were important previously to ensure that there was a
unique winner other than a of any subelection not corresponding to a satisfying assignment,
but in this case they are not necessary.
• The distinguished candidate p.
• For every variable xi ∈ U , candidates x
+
i , x
−
i , and x
′
i.
• For every clause ci ∈ Cl, a candidate ci.
• Helper candidates a and a′.
The new scores will be as follows.
• p beats a by 2 votes.
• Every clause candidate c beats p by 4 votes.
• Every clause candidate c beats a by 4 votes.
• a beats a′ by 6 votes.
• a′ beats every x+i and x
−
i by 6 votes.
• a′ beats every x′i by 2 votes.
• p beats every x+i and x
−
i by 2 votes.
• For every xi, x
′
i beats x
−
i , x
−
i beats x
+
i , and x
+
i beats a, all by 4 votes.
• For every variable xi, candidates x
+
i beats every clause candidate ci where the corre-
sponding clause is satisfied by xi assigned to true, by 6 votes.
• For every variable xi, candidates x
−
i beats every clause candidate c where the corre-
sponding clause is satisfied by xi assigned to false, by 6 votes.
If we map from a positive 3SAT instance we must have a positive control instance.
The partition can be as follows: In the first partition include a, a′, variable assignment
candidates corresponding to a satisfying assignment, and every ci and x
′ candidate. The
other partition will contain just p and the remaining variable assignment candidates. In the
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first subelection, a will be the only winner, as they will have strong paths to all the clause
candidates and no candidate has a strong path to them. p will win the final election with a
and possibly also with some variable assignment candidates (in the nonrunoff case)
If we map to a positive control instance we must have a satisfiable 3SAT instance. Since
we are working in the TP model, at least one candidate will survive each subelection. The
only candidates that p beat are a and the variable assignment candidates (by only a narrow
margin), so to win we must use a to eliminate any candidates that beat p in a subelection.
Thus we have to make sure that a is a winner of their subelection, and no other candidate
that beats p is a winner. For this to happen a must have a strong path to every clause
candidate and none of the x′ candidates can have strong paths back to a. We must include
a valid satisfying assignment of variable assignment candidates for this to be the case, so
we must have a satisfiable formula.
2.2.4 Destructive Control by Partition of Candidates Cases
Theorem 2.5. Schulze voting is vulnerable to destructive control by partition of candidates
and destructive control by runoff-partition of candidates in either the ties-promote or ties-
eliminate model.
Schulze voting is vulnerable to each of the variants of destructive control by partition
of candidates. We will show this, and additionally show that these problems are easy for a
broad class of Condorcet voting systems.
In the nonunique-winner model that we are following here, both of the pairs destructive
control by partition of candidates, ties eliminate and destructive control by runoff partition
of candidates, ties eliminate; and destructive control by partition of candidates, ties promote
and destructive control by runoff partition of candidates, ties promote are in fact the same
problems, that is, the same sets. This fact was discovered in [HHM12] by noting shared alter-
native characterizations of these problems. The nominal difference is that in the “partition
of candidates” case, the candidate set is partitioned and only one part undergoes a culling
subelection while the other part gets a bye, while in the “runoff partition of candidates”
case, both parts of the partition first face a subelection. In truth they are much simpler
problems, and identical (within the same tie-handling model). Namely, the sets DC-PC-TE
and DC-RPC-TE are equivalent to the set of instances ((C, V ), p) where there is some set
C′ ⊆ C with p ∈ C′ such that p is not a unique winner of the election (C′, V ). The sets
DC-PC-TP and DC-RPC-TP are equivalent to the set of instances ((C, V ), p) where there
is some set C′ ⊆ C with p ∈ C′ such that p is not a winner of the election (C′, V ). We will
build algorithms for these cases aided by these characterizations.
These algorithms are optimal in a class of voting systems that are Condorcet voting
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systems that also possess a weaker version of the Condorcet criteria—where if there are any
candidates that do no worse than tying in pairwise contests with other candidates (known
as weak Condorcet winners), they will be winners (possibly, but not necessarily unique)
of the election. There can potentially be one or more than one such candidates. Schulze
voting is such a voting system: If a candidate is a weak Condorcet winner, doing no worse
than tying against any other candidate, no candidate can have a path to that candidate of
strength greater than 0, and since that candidate at least ties every other candidate, he or
she has a path of strength at least 0 to every other candidate. Thus he or she is unbeaten
in Schulze score, and will be a winner.
Other Condorcet voting systems that possess this property include Copeland1, Minimax,
and Ranked Pairs.
DC-PC-TP/DC-RPC-TP Case. Recall our alternate characterization for these problems,
that the set of positive instances is the same as the set of instances ((C, V ), p) where there
is some set C′ ⊆ C with p ∈ C′ such that p is not a winner of the election (C′, V ). Thus,
finding if we have a positive instance is very similar to the problem of finding if we have
a positive instance in the destructive control by deleting candidates problem, except that
there is no longer a limit on the number of candidates we can delete. Thus we do not
have to carefully limit the number of deleted candidates, but we can freely delete as many
candidates as necessary to put p in a losing scenario.
Given a control instance ((C, V ), p), all we must do is see if there is any candidate a ∈ C,
a 6= p, such that netadv(a, p) > 0. If such a candidate exists, we let our first partition be
{a, p} and let the second be C−{a, p}. p will lose their initial election to a, and be eliminated
from the election. If there is no such candidate, p is a weak Condorcet winner, and thus they
will always be a winner of the election among any subset of the candidates, as they will be a
weak Condorcet winner (at least, or possible a Condorcet winner) among any subset of the
candidates. Thus our algorithm will indicate failure. We can perform this check through
a simple examination of the net advantage scores which can be generated from an election
in polynomial time, and so this algorithm runs in polynomial time. Thus Schulze voting
(and any other system meeting the aforementioned criteria) is vulnerable and constructively
vulnerable to DC-PC-TP/DC-RPC-TP.
DC-PC-TE/DC-RPC-TE Case. These cases have the alternate characterization that the
set of positive instances is equivalent to the set of instances ((C, V ), p) where there is some
set C′ ⊆ C with p ∈ C′ such that p is not a unique winner of the election (C′, V ), that is,
there are multiple winners, or no winners, or there is a single winner that is not p. This
case thus differs only slightly from the DC-PC-TP/DC-RPC-TP case and we can create a
very similar simple algorithm.
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Given a control instance ((C, V ), p), we can find a successful action if one exists by simply
checking if there is any candidate a ∈ C, a 6= p, such that netadv(a, p) ≥ 0. If so, we let
our first partition be {a, p} and let the second be C − {a, p}. This results in p either not
being a winner of the subelection at all or being a winner along with a if the net advantage
score is 0. Either way, p will not be promoted to the final election and thus they will not be
a winner of the final election. If there is no such candidate, p is a Condorcet winner, and
they will be a Condorcet winner among any subset of the candidates, so this type of control
will never be possible, and our algorithm will indicate that. As before, generating the net
advantage function is easily possible in polynomial time, and the simple check will only
take polynomial time, so Schulze voting (and any other system meeting the aforementioned
criteria) is vulnerable and constructively vulnerable to DC-PC-TE/DC-RPC-TE.
2.2.5 Partition of Voters Cases
Theorem 2.6. Schulze voting is resistant to constructive control by partition of voters, ties
eliminate.
Proof. We will reduce from a 3SAT instance (U,Cl) and output a control instance ((C, V ), p).
The candidate set C will be as follows:
• A distinguished candidate p.
• A Candidate ci for every clause ci ∈ Cl.
• A candidate xi for every variable xi ∈ U .
• An auxiliary candidate a.
The voter set V will be as follows:
• For each variable xi, where D is the set of clauses satisfied by xi assigned to true, a
voter ranking p over ci for ci ∈ D and cj over p for cj /∈ D, ranking xi over p, but
ranking p over xj for xj ∈ U − {xi}, and ranking p over a.
• For each variable xi, where D is the set of clauses satisfied by xi assigned to false, a
voter ranking p over ci for ci ∈ D and cj over p for cj /∈ D, ranking xi over p, but
ranking p over xj for xj ∈ U − {xi}, and ranking p over a.
• ||U || − 3 voters preferring p over every ci, but preferring every xi and a over p.
• 1 voter preferring p over every ci and over a, but preferring every xi over p.
• 2 voters preferring p over every ci and xi but with a preferred over p.
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If we are mapping from a positive 3SAT instance, it will be possible to make p win
the final election through this type of control. The partition will be as follows: The first
partition will contain all of the third, fourth, and fifth groups of voters, and will contain
voters from the first two groups corresponding to a satisfying assignment. The result of
adding the voters from the third, fourth, and fifth groups will be to give p ||U || votes over
each ci, each xi ||U || − 4 votes over p, and a ||U || − 2 votes over p. By adding the variable
assignment voters corresponding to satisfying assignment, we decrease every p-ci edge by no
more than ||U ||− 2, increase every p-xi edge by ||U ||− 2, and increase the p-a edge by ||U ||.
Thus p will beat every candidate and win their subelection. In the other subelection, with
the remaining variable assignment candidates, p will tie with some of the clause candidates
(unless the inverse assignment is also satisfiable) and so no candidates will be promoted. p
will thus be alone in the final election and win.
If we map to a positive control instance, the 3SAT instance will be satisfiable. No voter
prefers p outright, so we must balance their votes against the other voters to have a chance.
The voters in the first two groups prefer p over a and they mostly prefer p over the variable
candidates, but they mostly prefer the clause candidates over p. The voters in the third,
fourth, and fifth groups can boost p over the clause candidates, but they give a and the
variable candidates an advantage over p. To make p the only winner of a subelection, we
have to carefully select the voters from the first two groups to keep p ahead of both the
variable and clause candidates. To do so we must ensure that at least one voter prefers p
over each ci, and only one voter prefers each xi over p. These voters thus correspond to a
satisfying assignment, so the 3SAT instance must be satisfiable.
Theorem 2.7. Schulze voting is resistant to constructive control by partition of voters, ties
promote.
Proof. This case can be shown through a reduction from 3SAT very similar to the previous
case. We will map from a 3SAT instance (U,Cl) to a control instance ((C, V ), p). We will
have the following candidate set C:
• A distinguished candidate p.
• A Candidate ci for every clause ci ∈ Cl.
• A candidate xi for every variable x ∈ U .
• An auxiliary candidate a.
The voter set V will be the following:
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• For each variable xi, where D is the set of clauses satisfied by xi assigned to true, a
voter ranking p over ci for ci ∈ D and cj over p for cj /∈ D, ranking xi over p, but
ranking p over xj for xj ∈ U − {xi}, and ranking p over a.
• For each variable xi, where D is the set of clauses satisfied by xi assigned to false, a
voter ranking p over ci for ci ∈ D and cj over p for cj /∈ D, ranking xi over p, but
ranking p over xj for xj ∈ U − {xi}, and ranking p over a.
• ||U || − 1 voters preferring p over every ci, but preferring every xi and a over p.
• 1 voter preferring p over every ci but with a and every xi preferred over p.
• ||U || + 2 voters preferring a over the variable assignment candidates over the clause
candidates over p.
We have just changed the later groups of voters and left the variable assignment voters
the same. Now, with just the third and fourth groups of voters present a has ||U || votes over
every ci and ||U || − 2 votes over every xi, and a has ||U || − 2 votes over p. This proof can
proceed similarly to the previous case, but noting that now we are in the TP model, multiple
candidates can be promoted to the final election, so we must ensure that no candidates that
can beat p with the entire voter set will make it. Thus to make p a winner we must cause
them to at least tie the xi and a candidates, and cause them to beat the ci candidates in
the first round. For this to happen we must include in a partition voters corresponding
to a satisfying assignment, as well as the third and fourth groups of voters. In the other
partition we must prevent any of the clause candidates from winning, and this will happen
with the remaining variable assignment voters and the fifth group of voters: a will be the
only winner. Thus p will end up being a winner of the final election.
If we have a positive control instance, p must be a winner of at least one initial subelec-
tion, and so this partition must have balanced the points p gets over the clause candidates
from the third and fourth groups with the points p gets over the variable candidates and a
from the first two groups, and the voters from the first two groups must have been carefully
chosen so at least one of them has p over each clause candidate, and no more than one has
each variable candidate over p. Thus there must be a satisfying assignment for the 3SAT
instance.
Theorem 2.8. Schulze voting is resistant to destructive control by partition of voters, ties
eliminate.
Proof. We will reduce from a 3SAT instance (U,Cl) and construct a control instance
((C, V ), p). The candidate set C will be as follows:
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• The distinguished candidate p.
• The adversary candidates a and b.
• Candidates ci and c
′
i for each clause ci ∈ Cl.
• Candidates xi and x
′
i for each variable xi ∈ U .
The voter set V will be as follows:
• For each variable xi, where D is the set of clauses satisfied by xi assigned to true, a
voter ranking c′i over ci for ci ∈ D and cj over c
′
j for cj ∈ Cl −D, ranking x
′
i over xi,
but ranking xj over x
′
j for xj ∈ U−{xi}, ranking p over a and b, the clause candidates
over a and the variable candidates over b.
• For each variable xi, where D is the set of clauses satisfied by xi assigned to false, a
voter ranking c′i over ci for ci ∈ D and cj over c
′
j for cj ∈ Cl −D, ranking x
′
i over xi,
but ranking xj over x
′
j for xj ∈ U −{x}, ranking p over a and b, the clause candidates
over a and the variable candidates over b.
• 2||U || − 2 voters ranking a > p > b, with the other candidates evenly distributed.
• 2||U || − 2 voters ranking b > p > a, with the other candidates evenly distributed.
The unspecified parts of the votes should be set to make the groups of candidates as
even as possible, except for the c′i candidates, among whom there should be strong paths
from each candidate to each candidate.
If the mapped-from 3SAT instance is satisfiable, we will be able to defeat p through
partition of voters. The partition we use will be the following. The first part will consist
of voters from the first two groups corresponding to a satisfying assignment, and the voters
from the third group. The second part will consist of the remaining voters from the first
two groups, and the voters from the fourth group. a will defeat p in the first partition. By
selecting the voters to correspond to a satisfying assignment we weaken all of the paths from
p to a going through the clause candidates to be ||U || − 2 in strength. The third group of
voters provide support for a over p, bringing the a→ p edge to be ||U ||−2 in strength. Thus
a ties p, and no candidate will be promoted from this subelection. In the other subelection,
b will tie p for similar reasons, as they will have an edge of ||U || − 2 to p while that will also
be the strength of the best path from p to b going through any of the variable candidates.
Thus no candidate makes it to the final election and control is successful.
If the mapped-to control instance is positive, we must have a positive 3SAT instance.
p will win the final election against any other candidate if they make it there, so to defeat
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them we must make them lose both initial subelections. No voters rank p below both a and
b, the strongest other candidates, so we must defeat p with a in one subelection and defeat
p with b in the other. To make b beat p, we have to include the fourth group of voters, the
only voters that rank b over p. b would defeat p if we include just these voters, but then
p would win the other subelection with the support of all the variable assignment voters.
Thus we have to include half the variable assignment voters to give a a chance as well, and
we must pick voters to weaken the paths from p to b. This will require us to pick only one
voter corresponding to each variable. The other subelection will proceed similarly, but we
will have to pick at least one voter satisfying each clause to weaken the p-a paths. Thus
there must be a valid satisfying assignment for the 3SAT instance if control is possible.
Theorem 2.9. Schulze voting is resistant to destructive control by partition of voters, ties
promote.
Proof. This case can proceed very similarly to the previous case in the TE model, except that
we just have to slightly change some of the numbers so that the adversary candidates each
will fully defeat rather than tie with p in order to eliminate p from both initial subelections.
The new voters will be as follows, and everything else can proceed in the same way.
• For each variable xi, where D is the set of clauses satisfied by xi assigned to true, a
voter ranking c′i over ci for ci ∈ D and cj over c
′
j for cj ∈ Cl −D, ranking x
′
i over xi,
but ranking xj over x
′
j for xj ∈ U−{xi}, ranking p over a and b, the clause candidates
over a and the variable candidates over b.
• For each variable xi, where D is the set of clauses satisfied by xi assigned to false, a
voter ranking c′i over ci for ci ∈ D and cj over c
′
j for cj ∈ Cl −D, ranking x
′
i over xi,
but ranking xj over x
′
j for xj ∈ U−{xi}, ranking p over a and b, the clause candidates
over a and the variable candidates over b.
• 2||U || voters ranking a > p > b, with the other candidates evenly distributed.
• 2||U || voters ranking b > p > a, with the other candidates evenly distributed.
2.2.6 Destructive Adding/Deleting Candidates
For the final cases of control, we do not resolve their complexity, but we do reduce the
problems to their core: They are no harder than a simpler problem called path-preserving
vertex cut.
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Proposition 2.10. Each of destructive control by adding candidates, destructive control
by unlimited adding of candidates, and destructive control by deleting candidates in Schulze
voting polynomial-time Turing reduces to path-preserving vertex cut.
Proof. We define path-preserving vertex cut as follows.
Given A directed graph G = (V,E), distinct vertices s, t ∈ V , and a deleting limit k ∈ N.
Question Is there a set of vertices V ′, ||V ′|| ≤ k, such that the induced graph on G with
V ′ removed contains a path from t to s but not any path from s to t?
We note that the standard vertex cut problem is well-known to be solvable in polynomial
time, but to the best of our knowledge the complexity of this variant is unknown (other than
that it is clearly in NP). Given this result, Schulze voting will be vulnerable to each of these
control cases if this problem is found to be in P.
We will describe how these control cases can reduce to this problem, first handling the
DC-DC case. Our input will be a DC-DC instance ((C, V ), p, k). Since this destructive case
of control, we only have to make the distinguished candidate p not a winner rather than
making any particular candidate positively a winner. To do this we must alter the election
so that some other candidate has a better path to p than p has to that candidate. Since
this is a case of control by deleting candidates, we can only eliminate paths in the election
graph, not create them. So we have to try to succeed by breaking the paths from p to some
other candidate.
We can first handle the cases where p is a Condorcet winner (control will be impossible)
or where p is already beaten by some candidate (control is trivial). Otherwise, we will loop
through the candidates and see if we can make any of them beat p.
For each candidate a, we will first find the subgraph containing all maximum-strength
paths to p (using a modified Floyd-Warshall algorithm), and also the subgraph containing all
paths from p to a at least as strong as the strongest a-p path. We will then take the union of
these graphs, disregard the edge weights, and apply a subroutine for path-preserving vertex
cut. This will tell us if there is any way to cut all of the strong paths from p to a while
preserving one of the strongest ones from a to p. If we ever get a positive result from this
call, we can indicate success. Now, it may be that we can succeed by preserving a path
other than the strongest path from a to p. So if we failed, we repeat the process except
considering paths from a to p and from p to a that are a little less strong, going down as far
as the strength of the p-a edge (which is not cuttable). This loop is polynomially bounded
in the number of edges, as there can only be as many path strengths as there are edges. We
indicate failure if we never achieve success with any vertex or path strength.
The other cases can be handled similarly. The difference is that they are adding-
candidates problems instead of deleting-candidates problems, but we can reduce them to
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modified deleting-candidates problems by including all of the addable vertices and then
solving them as deleting-candidates problems where we can only delete the vertices in the
added sets. Additionally, in the non-unlimited case, we would be restricted as to how many
of the vertices are added, so we would have to only look at paths from a to p that use a
limited number of the added vertices.
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